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NOTES
INDIGNITIES AS GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
A number of states, and two Federal Territories, have adopted as grounds
for divorce "indignities" that render the complaining party's condition "intolerable") or his or her life "burdensome" ;2 and several contain both conditions.3
Although there is a difference in the lay definition of "intolerable" and "burdensome", 4 yet the courts apparently have not distinguished the meaning when rendering their decisions. Four of these statutes speak of "indignities to the person,"
two others of "personal indignities" and Wyoming and Missouri's statutes simply
speak of "indignities" without other description. The courts have not differed in
their interpretation of "indignities to the person" and "indignities to the other".
Both mean indignities to the complaining spouse.5
All of the states, with the exception of North Carolina, that include "indignities" as grounds for divorce, have also included in their statutes "cruelty" as
a separate grounds. It is important to note, then, that the right to a divorce for
indignities is separate and apart from the relief for cruelty. 6 As a general rule,
cruelty must consist of conduct which inflicts or threatens infliction of bodily
harm. 7.. Some courts have said that, generally speaking, indignities may consist
of rudeness, vulgarity, unmerited reproach, haughtiness, contumely, studied neg1. Ark. (Crawford and Moses) 1921 see. 49-3500 . . ."or shall offer such indignities to
the person of the other as shall render his or her condition intolerable".
Tenn. Code (Michie's) 1938 sec. 2-8427 . . . "that the husband has offered such indignities to the wife's person as to render her condition intolerable".
Mo. Stat. Ann. 1939 sec. 1514 ... "or shall offer such indignities to the other as shall
render his or her condition intolerable".
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 3-5905 ... "when either party shall offer such indignities
to the other, as shall render his or her condition intolerable".
2. Ore. Comp. Laws 1940 sec. 32-1117 . . . "or personal indignities rendering life burdensome".
Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington) 1932 sec. 982.
"or personal indignities rendering
life burdensome".
3. N. C. Gen. Stat. 1943 sec. 50-7 . . . "or offer such indignities to the person of the
other as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome".
Pa. Stat. (Purdon's) 1936 sec. 23-10 . . . "shall have offered such indignities to the
person of the injured and innocent spouse, as to render his or condition intolerable
and life burdensome".
It is interesting to note that the Statute of Tennessee has a unique provision in that
the wife alone can bring action. This was the law in Pennsylvania until the Divorce
Law of 1929, Pub. Law. 1237 placed the husband and wife on the same equality.
The following states have similar statutes but for the purposes of this article will
not be considered: Ariz. Code 1939 sec. 50-315 . . . "excesses, cruel treatment or outrages". R. I. Gen. Laws 1938 sec. 416-2 . . . "gross misbehavior and wickedness".
Tex. Stat. (Vernon's) 1936 see. 4629 . . . "excesses, cruel treatment or outrages".
4. Webster's Dictionary (1936) "Intolerable-not capable of being borne". "Burdensome-grievous to be borne".
5. Johnston v. Johnston, 260 S.W. 770 (Mo. App. 1924) ; Deutsch v. Deutsch 141 Pa.
Super 339, 14 A. (2d) 586 (1940).
6.
27 C.J.S. 586 "The offense of inflicting personal indignities on a spouse, although
similar to that of cruelty, includes conduct which is not within the definition of cruelty
as a ground for divorce". See Bassett v. Bassett, 280 S.W. 430, 435 (Mo. App. 1926) ;
Sleight v. Sleight, 119 Pa. Super. 300, 181 Ad. 69 (1935) ; Hepworth v. Hepworth,
129 Pa. Super. 360, 195 Atl. 924 (1937) ; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 52 Wash. 160, 100 Pac.
321 (1909) ; In McDevitt v. McDevitt 148 Pa. Super. 522, 25 A. (2d) 853 (1942),
the husband was granted divorce for indignities to the person where wife weighed
200 pounds and he weighed 145. Throughout the lengthy testimony it was shown that
although she resorted to force occasionally, her chief weapon was her tongue. Charge
of cruelty was disallowed but divorce was granted for indignities.
7. Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations 268 (1931).
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lect, intentional incivility, manfest disdain, abusive language, malignant ridicule
and every other plain manifestation of settled hate and estrangement. 8 The indignities must amount to a species of mental cruelty 9 but bodily harm is not
required.10
In Wyoming, some doubt arises as to the distinction between cruelty and
indignities. 1/ In Bonham v. Bonham, 12 a divorce was sought on grounds of
cruelty and the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that mere austerity of temper,
petulance of manner, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention; even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not constitute
cruelty. In Mahoney v. Mahoney,13 the same court in granting divorce for indignities said, "Where defendant is guilty of indignities rendering plaintiff's life
intolerable, impairment of health need not be shown", and indicated that itwas
not required in case of cruelty. But the court seems to have reaffirmed the reasoning of the Bonham Case fifteen years later in Schultz v. Schultzl4 where divorce

was denied on grounds of cruelty and indignities. The facts of that case consisted
of only general statements of misbehavior or conclusions of the parties and there
was no evidence of threatened bodily harm. In contrast, the Supreme Court of
Washington in the Sabot Casel5 made a distinction when itdefined, "Indifference
is an indignity and unconcealed aversion is a cruelty". This indicates that they
are of the opinion the difference is apparently in the degree of severity of the act
or acts committed.
Proceeding as to what does and what does not amount to indignities, we are
faced with anomally that there is no adequate definition. This fact is best brought
out in WJick v. Wickl6 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that
the term, "indignities to the person of a wife", as a cause for divorce, had been
8. Sutherland v.Sutherland, 188 Ark. 955, 68 S.W.
Welborn, 189 Ark 1063, 76 S.W. (2d) 98 (1934)
339, 14 A. (2d) 586 (1940) ; Evans v. Evans,
(1943) ; Eberly v.Eberly, 154 Pa. Super. 641,

(2d) 1022, 1023 (1934) ; Welborn v.
; Deutsch v.Deutsch, 141 Pa. Super.
152 Pa. Super. 257, 31 A. (2d) 590
36 A. (2d) 729 (1944) ; Hogsett v.

Hogsett, 83 S.W. (2d) 152 (Mo. App. 1935).

9. Boehme v.Boehme, 72 S.W. (2d) 115 (Mo. App. 1934) ;Key v. Key, 93 S.W. (2d)
256 (Mo. App. 1936) ; Wirthman v.Wirthman, 225 Mo. A. 692, 39 S.W. (2d) 404
(1931) ; Bowers v. Bowers, 98 Ore. 548, 194 Pac. 697 (1921).
10. Wittmer v. Wittmer, 151 Pa. Super. 362, 30 A. (2d) 174, 176 (1943) ; Martin v.
Martin, 154 Pa. Super. 313, 35 A. (2d) 546, 548 (1944); Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N. C.
307, 37 S.E. (2d) 904, 905 (1946).
11. Because the Tennessee Statute (see footnote 1.) does not permit the husband to
bring action against the wife on grounds of indignities little distinction has been made
between cruelty and indignities. See Stargel v. Stargel, 107 S.V. (2d) 520 (Tenn.
App. 1937).
12. 25 Wyo. 449, 172 Pac. 333 (1918).
13. 43 Wyo. 157, 299 Pac. 273 (1931).
14. 46 Wyo. 121, 23 P. (2d) 351 (1933).
15. Sabot v. Sabot, 97 Wash. 395, 166 Pac. 624 (1917).
16. 352 Pa. Super. 25, 42 A. (2d) 76 (1945).
17. Taylor v. Taylor, 142 Pa. Super. 441, 16 A. (2d) 651 (1940) ; Whitewell v. Whitewell, 318 Mo.476, 300 S.W. 455 (1927) ; Bell v. Bell, 179 Ark. 171, 14- S.W. (2d) 551
1929) ; In Taylor v. Taylor, 76 N. C. 433, 436 (1877) the Supreme Court of North
Carolina said, "No deviating rule has been yet agreed upon by the courts or probably
can be, which will apply to allcases in determining what indignities are grounds for
divorce because they render the condition of the party injured intolerable. The
the temperament and state of health, habits and feelings of different
station.in life,
persons are so unlike that treatment which would send the broken heart of one to the
grave would make no sensible impression upon another".
See Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N. C. 229, 72 S.E. 876, 878 (1911).

NOTES
in the statutes since 1785 and that experience had shown it is impossible to embrace in a single definition the great variety of conduct intended to be included
in the meaning of the words used by the Legislature and at the same time to
exclude conduct not within the legislative description. It is also impossible to
lay down any rules that will apply to all cases, in determining what indignities
are grounds for divorce. The legislatures apparently chose to leave the subject at
large, and by the general words employed in the statutes, designed to leave such
17
case to be determined according to its own peculiar circumstances.
Perhaps the best way to approach this subject is in a negative manner, keeping in mind the social and natural value of maintaining the security of the marriage bond. In Schultz v. Schultz,18 the Supreme Court of Wyoming refused to
grant a divorce to a wife because of insufficient evidence to authorize the decree,
saying, "Mere general statements of misbehavior or conclusions of the parties will
not suffice. The court must be placed in possession of the facts of the case, and
these facts must fully establish a statutory ground for divorce, in order to invoke
the great judicial power to rend assunder the family relation, a relation on which
civilized society so greatly relies for its support." Generally the courts have followed the line of reasoning in holding that a single act of indignity is not sufficient
to make out a case entitling the complaining party to a divorce on ground of indignities.19 The courts seem unanimous in holding that the misconduct must be
continued and must have existed over a period of time. 20 It has been held that
slight altercations, incompatibility or temporary irritation are insufficient indignities21 and refusal of a wife to indulge in sexual intercourse does not satisfy
divorce requirements. 22
Turning to the positive side of the problem, it is apparent that generally the
courts will dissolve the marital relation if the continued status of the parties will
be a detriment to them as individuals and to society itself. The Springfield Court
of Appeals of Missouri 2 3 has stated, "There is little compelling evidence corroborating plaintiff but from the cold record it is clear to us that there is not even
a remote possibility that a reconciliation could be effected and the parties live
happily together in the future". The courts seem to to hold that it is not the
18. 46 Wyo. 121, 23 P. (2d) 351 (1933).
19. Johnston v. Johnston, 260 S.W. 770 (Mo. App. 1924); Llewellyn v. Llewellyn, 229
Mo. App. 1178, 88 S.W. (2d) 235 (1934) ; Othmer v. Othmer, 158 Pa. Super. 384, 45
A. (2d) 389 (1946) ; Denison v. Denison, 189 Ark. 239, 71 S.W. (2d) 1055 (1934)
Settles v. Settles, 195 S.W. (2d) 59, (Ark. 1946).
20. Kamp v. Kamp, 36 Wyo. 310, 254 Pac. 689 (1927) ; Cain v. Cain, 145 Ark. 224, 224
S.W. 481 (1920) ; See Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N. C. 307, 37 S.E. (2d) 904, 905 (1946) ;
Stevens v. Stevens, 158 S.W. (2d) 238 (Mo. App. 1942) ; Deutsch v. Deutsch, 141 Pa.
Super. 339, 14 A. (2d) 586 (1940) ; Wittmer v. Wittmer, 151 Pa. Super. 362, 30 A.
(2d) 174, 176 (1943) ; Sabot v. Sabot, 97 Wash. 395, 166 Pac. 624 (1917).
21. In Arnold v. Arnold, 15 Ark. 32, 170 S.W. 486 (1914) the Supreme Court of Arkansas
said in refusing divorce for indignities: "A little confessed, a little endured, a little
forgiven, and all is cured, daily practiced from the first by this now unhappy couple,
would have kept closed forever the Pandora's box of matrimonial sorrows from which
relief is now sought. But relief will not be granted in such cases." See Sutherland v.
Sutherland, 188 Ark. 955, 68 S.W. (2d) 1022 (1934) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 142 Pa.
Super. 441, 16 A. (2d) 651 (1940) ; Fite v. Fite, 196 S.W. (2d) 65 (Mo. App. 1946).
22. James v. James, 126 Pa. Super. 479, 191 Atd. 191 (1937).
23. White v. White, 180 S.W. (2d) 229 (Mo. App. 1944) ; Contra, Bobst v. Bobst, 160
Pa. Super. 340, 51 A. (2d) 414 (1947).
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words used nor the acts done; it is the effect of them upon the aggrieved party
that is determinative. 2 4
In considering the divorce problem it must be realized that in the matrimonial union there are trials causing much weariness and suffering which parties
to the marriage must bear. 25 The policy of the state, as well as the sacred nature
of the marriage covenant, requires patient endurance. 26 There are, however,
insults and abuses which are outside the realm of the marriage covenant, submission to which was never contemplated and which are not expected to be
borne.2 7
What does and what does not constitute indignities as grounds for divorce,
whether they are intolerable or burdensome, will vary with the times. However,
it is apparent that the offending party must be guilty of conduct that is of such
nature as to render it necessary for the public good and the individuals themselves
to be separated. It is the general holding of the courts that mere faults of temper
and of manner do not constitute grounds; nor does mere incompatibility of the
parties. A single act of indignity does not constitute conduct having the stature
of intolerability; it must be persisted in either continually or recurrently so that
it is beyond reasonable endurance. Not only the animus of the offender but also
the subjective effect upon the victim is considered. 2 8 What may be an indignity
to one person may not be to another. The courts in arriving at their decisions
generally will consider the cumulative effects of the petitioner's treatment in determning if the personal and public objects of marriage have been in fact destroyed
beyond rehabilitation.
FRANK C. CONLEY.

24. Thompson v. Thompson, 16 Wash. (2d) 78, 132 P. (2d) 734 (1943) ; In Galigher v.
Galigher, 49 Ore. 155, 89 Pac. 146 (1907)

the Supreme Court of Oregon said, "The

commission of petty thefts by a husband and cacheing the fruits of his theft in and
about his dwelling is certainly a personal indignity to a wife of honesty and refined
feelings". Sullivan v. Sullivan, 52 Wash. 160, 100 Pac. 321 (1909).
25. Capps v. Capps, 65 S.W. (2d) 661, 663 (Mo. App. 1933); Bowers v. Bowers, 98
Ore. 548, 194 Pac. 697, 698 (1921) ; De Lisi v. De Lisi, 139 Pa. Super 440, 12 A. (2d)

468 (1940).

26. Schultz v. Schultz, 46 Wyo. 121, 23 P. (2d) 351 (1933) ; Press v. Press, 188 Ark. 854,
67 S.W. (2d) 1013, 1017 (1934).
27. Trigg v. Trigg, 226 Mo. App. 284, 41 S.W. (2d) 583 (1931) ; Kamp v. Kamp, 36
Wyo. 310, 254 Pac. 689 (1927) ; Galigher v. Galigher, 49 Ore. 155, 89 Pac. 146 (1907).
28. There is a difference of opinion among the courts as to the requirement that the com-

plaining party must be innocent and injured. In Pennsylvania, if the action is for

absolute divorce the complaining spouse is required (Pa. Stat. 1936 sec. 23-10) to be
"innocent and injured". The Supreme Court of that state has taken a realistic view

of this matter and does not deny a divorce merely because some fault on the part
of the petitioner is shown. See Di Stefano v. Stefano, 152 Pa. Super. 115, 31 A. (2d)
357 (1943) ; Stevens v. Stevens, 158 S.W. (2d) 238 (Mo. App. 1942). The Supreme
Court of Arkansas has taken a different view in that when both parties are to blame

relief will not be granted because it is as true of divorce cases as of any others
that a party must come into a court of equity with clean
made to give relief to the innocent and not to the guilty.
Ark. 582, 177 S.W. 1 (1915). In Wyoming both parties
crimination" statute (Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 3-5908)

hands and divorce laws are
See Meffert v. Meffert, 118
may be at fault as the "reprovides that the complain-

ing party shall not be guilty of the same crime or misconduct charged against the
defendant. See Kamp v. Kamp, 36 Wyo. 310, 254 Pac. 689 (1927).

